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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant Charles Williams raises three issues in his appeal from a trial
court judgment entered in favor of the State:
Issue I

Whether the trial court should have arrested judgment after new

evidence established that the State rested its case on substantially unreliable
evidence.
Standard of Review: The Court reviews the denial of a Defendant's
Motion to Arrest Judgment for abuse of discretion. State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT
App 264,110,167 P.3d 516, 519.
Issue 2: Whether the Trial Court should have granted Defendant's Motion
for New Trial after new evidence concerning the central issue of the case was
brought to light.
Standard of R eview: The Court reviews the denial of a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion. At the same
time, however, the court reviews the legal standards applied by the trial court in
denying the motion for correctness." State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, f 12,167
P.3d 516, 519; State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34,1(45, 44 P.3d 805.
issi:

Whether the Trial Court should have granted Defendant's Motion

for New Trial after defense counsel discovered evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct.
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Standard of Review: The Court reviews the denial of a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion. At the same
time, however, the court reviews the legal standards applied by the trial court in
denying the motion for correctness." State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, f 12,167
P.3d 516, 519; State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34,^45, 44 P.3d 805.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case,

This case arises from criminal charges related to domestic violence. It is
undisputed that the victim and defendant engaged in a heated disagreement.
However, the details of that disagreement remain in dispute. Criminal charges
were entered upon alleged victim Alecia Belt's written statement to police,
produced shortly after said disagreement. In her statement, Alecia accused
Defendant Charles Williams of threatening her life and kicking her in front of her
two minor children. Charles has consistently maintained his innocence, and
following trial, Alecia provided additional testimony that corroborates Charles's
version of events. This appeal involves factual issues regarding witness
credibility and procedural issues concerning post-trial evidence.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Defendant was tried by a six-person jury on June 16, 2010. Alecia was the
State's only substantive witness, and Charles was the sole defense witness. At
the close of trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on one charge of Domestic
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Violence Assault and two charges of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a
Child. Shortly thereafter, Alecia contacted defense counsel and admitted to
committing perjury as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. On August 16, 2010,
Defendant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment or for New Trial, accompanied by
two affidavits prepared by Alecia. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion on November 6, 2010 and heard arguments from counsel on December 6,
2010. The court denied defense counsel's motion and proceeded to sentencing.
Defendant hereby appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Arrest
Judgment or for New Trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

The Incident.

Defendant Charles Williams (Charles) dated alleged victim Alecia Belt
(Alecia) for nearly three years, lived with her for a portion of that time, and had
four children with her. (R. at 97) In early 2009, Charles was unemployed, Alecia
was pregnant with twins, and finances were a constant source of contention for
the couple. (R. at 103,124) On March 6, Charles and Alecia were eating
breakfast together, when an argument over an unpaid utility bill erupted. (R. at
98,101) As the disagreement progressed, Charles became increasingly frustrated
and upset; he yelled, swore, and called Alecia names. (R. at 104,169) In the
midst of this heated argument, Alecia engaged in a telephone conversation with
her nurse regarding pain related to pregnancy. (R. at 105,172) The nurse
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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overheard yelling in the background, and concerned, called the police. (R. at 108,
172) A police officers and crime lab technician responded to the couple's home,
but Charles was no longer there. (R. at 116) The technician photographed
several marks on Alecia's leg, which she alleged were the result of Charles
kicking her during their heated disagreement. (R. at 116,127) According to
Alecia, both of the couple's children were present at the time. (R. at 111) Alecia
also alleged that Charles threatened her life during the altercation. (R. at 111)
Charles was subsequently charged with Domestic Violence Assault and two
counts of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child.
II.

Trial by Jury.

On June 16, 2010, Charles was tried by a six-person jury. (Docket) During
her opening statements to the jury, the State's prosecutor emphasized that a large
part of the jury's job was to assess the credibility of witnesses. (R. 86) She
further explained that a victim's willingness to testify in a domestic violence case
is one factor that should be considered in assessing credibility. (R. 86)
Alecia was the State's only substantive witness, and Charles was the sole
defense witness. The witnesses provided substantially different versions of the
events and details leading to Charles's arrest. The witnesses disagreed as to
whether the children were at home during the argument, who provided money
for the unpaid bill, who initiated Alecia's phone call, and even as to whether
Charles owned a car. (R. 104,108, 111, 121,169,172,174)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Alecia took the witness stand first and testified for a short twelve minutes
before the prosecutor presented her with her written statement to police,
prepared on the day of the incident. (State's Objection, R. 110) Alecia then
proceeded with her testimony, which largely reflected the written statement. (R.
110-117) Specifically, Alecia testified that the defendant threatened to kill her
and kicked her on the left leg in the presence of her two children. (R. 114) Alecia
further testified that she did not want to come to court, because she was afraid of
Mr. Williams. (R. I l l ) However, during cross examination and re-direct, Ms.
Belt admitted that she continued to keep her belongings at the defendant's house
and stayed overnight with him on occasion, including an overnight stay the
weekend prior to trial. (R. 118,150)
When called to the witness stand, Charles corroborated Ms. Belt's
testimony as to the cause of the couple's argument. (R. 167) He additionally
admitted to calling Alecia names, yelling and swearing. (R. 169) However,
Charles denied making any physical contact with Alecia or threatening her life.
(R. 174-175) He also testified that the children were not at home at the time of
the incident. (R. 175)
At the close of trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on one count of
Assault and two counts of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child. (R. 232)
III.

New Evidence,
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Following trial, Alecia contacted defense counsel concerning improprieties
at trial. Alecia memorialized the improprieties in two written affidavits,
detailing numerous instances of wrongful and potentially criminal conduct on
the part of herself, the State, and the victim advocate. (See Affidavits of Alecia
Bell) Alecia recanted her testimony in its entirety, claiming she was coerced by
the State into committing perjury at trial. (Affidavits of Alecia Bell) In response
to Alecia's allegations, the State filed affidavits of the trial prosecutor and victim
advocate, wherein Alecia was described as " cooper a tive" and " consistent/'
(Affidavits of Michael Riquino and Jaclyn Crawmer). Both the prosecutor and
the victim advocate denied engaging in any misconduct. (Affidavits of Michael
Riquino and Jaclyn Crawmer).
In light of Alecia's post-trial statements, defense counsel filed a Motion to
Arrest Judgment or for New Trial. On November 29, 2010, the court took
evidence on the motion. Alecia was advised of the potential legal consequences
of admitting to perjury. (M.R. at 9-10) After acknowledging her understanding,
Alecia reaffirmed the allegations set forth in her affidavits, specifically, she
admitted to providing false testimony at trial. (M.R. at 11) Alecia claimed she
had been threatened and coerced into testifying by the process server,
prosecutor, and victim advocate. (M.R. at 16,17) She further testified that she
had attempted to prevent the prosecutor from pursuing false charges by refusing
to enter to the courtroom. (M.R. at 21) According to Alecia, the prosecutor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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physically forced her into the courtroom. (M.R. at 24) On cross examination,
Alecia admitted she aware of Charles's recent release from jail but denied that
was the reason she had recanted her testimony. The State's attorney attempted to
admit evidence of threats made by Charles against Alecia prior to his release
date, but Alecia denied any fear of Charles. Following Alecia's testimony,
Charles's mother and aunt testified to hearing Alecia in the hallway prior to her
taking the witness stand, corroborating Alecia's claim that she had refused to
enter the courtroom. (M.R. at 74)
The State's prosecutor and victim advocate testified on behalf of the State.
The prosecutor admitted to instructing Alecia to come to court if subpoenaed,
but denied engaging in any coercion or other misconduct. (R. at 87) The victim
advocate testified that Alecia was afraid to testify but denied that she had told
him or the prosecutor that she had falsely accused Charles. (R. at 92)
Following the evidentiary hearing, the court heard oral argument and
subsequently denied defense counsel's motion. The court entered the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law:
"1. Whether Ms. Belt did or did not want to testify does not establish a
basis to grant either of the Defendant's motions.
2. The testimony presented by Ms. Belt after trial... was dramatically
different from her testimony at trial. However, Belt's testimony after
the trial was not credible and did not provide a basis to support
defendant's motions.
3. The testimony presented by Ms. Williams was biased in favor of her
son's motion.
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4. The testimony provided by Ms. Crawmer was credible and reliable,
and supported the factual basis for, and regularity of, the jury's
verdict, and provided additional reason for the denial of the
Defendant's motion.
5. Mr. Riquino's testimony also supports the basis and regularity of the
verdict. Mr. Riquino's testimony also possesses special credibility, as
he is the only witness who did not have a //side,/ in the case.
The Court finds that:
1. Based upon the unconvincing nature of the evidence presented in
support of the Defendant's motion, the record on its face does not
present a basis to support the defendant's motion to arrest judgment,
or motion for new trial; therefore,
2. The Defendant's motions are denied. "
Defendant appeals the trial court's judgment, arguing: (1) that
substantially unreliable evidence constitutes good cause to arrest judgment; (2)
that the evidence discovered post-trial goes to the central issue of the case and
constitutes grounds for a new trial; and (3) that the evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct is sufficient to warrant a new trial.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, convictions grounded in false or improbable evidence
should not be permitted to stand. The State rested its case on the testimony of
one substantive witness, Alecia Belt, the alleged victim in this case. Alecia's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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testimony constituted the only direct evidence against Defendant. Accordingly,
when post-trial evidence shed new light on the credibility of Alecia's trial
testimony, as well as the prosecutor's conduct at trial, the trial court should have
arrested judgment, or alternately, ordered a new trial.
The requirements for an arrest of judgment or new trial are set forth in
Rules 23 and 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant submits
that the evidence admitted in this case provides good cause for an arrest of
judgment, because it establishes substantial inconsistencies in Alecia's testimony.
Defendant further argues that the post-trial evidence constitutes grounds for a
new trial, because it (a) could not have been discovered prior to trial, (b) is not
cumulative, and (b) is likely to result in a different jury verdict. Importantly, the
trial court did not enter findings of fact as to any of the elements for new trial, as
set forth in State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). Finally, Defendant
submits that Alecia's allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct are
sufficient to warrant a new trial.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Should Have Arrested Judgment When New
Evidence Established That Charles's Conviction Was Not Based
On Substantial Reliable Evidence.

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "at any
time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court, upon its own initiative may,
or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment." Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (emphasis
added). "At common law, an arrest of judgment was the trial court's act of
refusing to enter judgment on a verdict because of some error appearing on the
face of the record." State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 1988)(internal
citations omitted). In State v. Owens, the court applied common law to find that
the defendant's motion looked past the record, and therefore, did not constitute a
motion for arrest of judgment. Id. However, Utah courts subsequently departed
from the common law rule and now permit motions to arrest judgment based on
facts proved, "at any time prior to the imposition of sentence," based on the
evidence or facts, as proved in trial or as admitted by the parties. State v. Workman,
806 P.2d 1198,1202 (Utah App. 1991). In appropriate cases, the court is
permitted to "invade the province of the jury" and find that the "verdict was
based on inherently improbable evidence." Id. at 1203.
In State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, the court emphasized that
convictions must be based on substantial reliable evidence or they cannot stand.
Id. at 114. The court further explained, that although credibility of witnesses is
generally determined by the jury, the jury's determination is appropriately
challenged where the witness's testimony is "inherently improbable," or
"apparently false." Id. at ^ 16. Testimony is "apparently false" if its falsity is
apparent, without any resort to inferences or deductions. Id. at 17. Testimony is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"inherently improbable" where there are "substantial inconsistencies in a sole
witness's testimony." Id. at 17. Attention to inconsistencies is particularly
important in criminal cases, where the high burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt permits the court to afford less deference to convictions arising from
inherently improbable, inconsistent, uncorroborated witness testimony. Id.
In the instant case, defense counsel appropriately moved the court for
arrest of judgment, prior to sentencing, on grounds that the State's only
substantive witness committed perjury. Alecia's affidavits and subsequent posttrial testimony raise serious credibility issues. She admitted, under oath, to
committing perjury. Such admissions render her trial testimony "apparently
false," or in the least, "inherently inconsistent. There are substantial
inconsistencies between Alecia's testimony at trial and her testimony after trial.
Charles respectfully submits that, at this juncture, the State's only
substantive witness has recanted her trial testimony in its entirety. Accordingly,
his conviction is not based on substantial reliable evidence and does not support
the jury's finding of guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Charles asks that the Court
reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to Arrest Judgment.
II.

The Trial Court Should Have Ordered A New Trial When New
Evidence Going Directly To The Central Issue Of The Case Was
Brought To Light Post-Trial.

Pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial
judge may grant a motion for new trial, "in the interest of justice, if there is any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a
party." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). "While the granting or refusing of the motion lies
in the sound discretion of the court, where there is grave suspicion that justice
may have been miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point
which new evidence will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant on
obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it
would be an abuse of sound discretion not to grant the same." Jensen v. Logan
City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (1936). To constitute grounds for a new trial,
new post-trial evidence must be sufficient to establish three elements: "(1) It must
be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be
such as to render a different result probable on retrial of the case." State v. James,
819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).
Importantly, in the instant case, the trial court did not enter findings of fact
as to any of the above-referenced James elements. Charles submits that the
evidence supporting his motion for new trial sufficiently establishes all three
elements.
a. Alecia's perjured testimony could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at trial.
First, new evidence must be such as could not with reasonable due
diligence have been discovered and produced at trial. Id. The evidence in this
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case clearly establishes the first element, and thus, warrants little argument. In,
State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264,167 P.3d 516, the court found that new
testimony could not have been discovered prior to trial because the witness did
not come forward with such testimony until after trial. Id. at Tj 22. Similarly, in
State v. James, the court found that third party testimony could not have been
discovered prior to trial, because the third party witness did not have personal
knowledge of the events to which he testified and did not come forward until
after the trial. 819 P.2d at 794. Here, defense counsel could not reasonably have
discovered that Alecia committed perjury prior to trial, because she did not come
forward with that information until after trial. Any knowledge that the
prosecutor may have had regarding Alecia's false statements was concealed from
the defendant. Accordingly, Charles respectfully submits that Alecia's post-trial
statements are sufficient to establish the first element required for a new trial.
b. Alecia's perjured testimony is not merely cumulative.
Testimony corroborating a criminal defendant's version of events is not
cumulative. In State v. James, Defendant James filed a motion for new trial after a
third party came forward to testify that one of the State's key witnesses had
committed perjury. 819 P.2d at 793. The trial court found the new evidence
cumulative, because "it went merely to the witness's credibility" and "did not
present new evidence of defendant's innocence." Id. at 794. The Utah Supreme
overruled the trial court, finding that the credibility evidence went beyond
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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refuting the witness's testimony. Id. The witness provided the State's only
evidence as to James's state of mind at the time of the crime. Id. The court found
that the third party's testimony was important evidence, in that it corroborated
the defendant's statements would be viewed by jurors as a different quality of
evidence than the defendant's own testimony. Id.
Similarly in the instant case, Alecia was the State's only witness to the
alleged criminal acts for which Charles was charged. Alecia and Charles were
the only people who testified as to the disputed facts in the case. The key issue
in this case was witness credibility, and Alecia's post-trial statements go directly
toward the truthfulness of the witnesses. There was no evidence presented at
trial to corroborate Charles's version of the incident at issue. Alecia's post-trial
affidavits and subsequent testimony effectively refutes the State's only direct
evidence. That evidence has an exceedingly high impeachment value. Multiple
inconsistent accounts of the same events produced by the same individual would
likely be viewed in a substantially different light by a jury than inconsistent
accounts produced by opposing parties.
Pursuant to the foregoing, Charles respectfully submits that Alecia's posttrial statements are not merely cumulative but provide new evidence going
directly to the heart of the case.
c. Alecia's perjured testimony is likely to render a different result
on retrial of the case.
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Finally, if the first two elements have been satisfied, and "there is a
reasonable likelihood that the new evidence would lead a jury to an outcome
more favorable" to the defendant, the court must grant a new trial. Utah v.
Martin, 2002 UT 34, ^[47; 44 P.3d 805, 816.
In Utah v. Martin, Defendant Martin was accused of forcing an alleged
victim into his vehicle at gun point, raping her, and then returning her to her car.
Id. at 806-807. Martin maintained that the alleged victim voluntarily entered his
car, and after a lengthy conversation, engaged in consensual sexual intercourse
with him. Id. at 808. In closing argument, the State framed the "central issue" in
the case as the credibility of the parties, and contended that the victim's
testimony was more reasonable than Martin's. Id. at 809, 816. The jury convicted
Martin. Id. However, following trial, new evidence was found that cast doubt
upon the victim's testimony. Id. The trial court denied Martin's motion for a
new trial, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court held that
"evidence with strong impeachment value could significantly impact the central
issue of the case - whom to believe about the circumstances of the sexual
contact." Id. at 816. The only direct evidence against Martin was Egan's
testimony, so any newly discovered evidence that could reasonably impact a
jury's assessment of that issue was sufficient to establish the likelihood of a more
favorable outcome to Martin. Id.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

New trials were similarly ordered on the basis of witness credibility in the
Utah cases of State v. James, 819 P.2d at 795-796, and State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27,
143-44.
Alternately, in State v. Wengreen, Defendant Wengreen filed a motion for
new trial after he discovered that the alleged child victim's version of events
changed during interviews subsequent to trial. Wengreen, 167 P.3d at 521. In that
case, the court found that the issue went beyond the credibility of the child's
testimony, because the State had introduced physical evidence and corroborating
testimony, which also supported the jury's verdict. Id at 522.
The instant case is similar to Martin, in that the alleged victim provided the
only direct evidence against Charles. The central issue in the case was witness
credibility, that is, which witness's version of the facts the jury adjudged to be
truthful. The State, in fact, stressed witness credibility in presenting its theory of
the case in opening statements. The State's effectively argued that Alecia's
willingness to confront her alleged abuser in court established her credibility as a
witness. Thus, evidence that Alecia subsequently admitted to committing
perjury could significantly impact a jury's determination of that central issue.
What is important here is not which of Alecia's two versions of events is more
credible, it is the fact that Alecia committed perjury, related to the case, on at
least one occasion. Such misconduct constitutes evidence of an extraordinarily
high impeachment value.
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Charles respectfully submits that Alecia's post-trial statements are
sufficient to establish the likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Charles
upon retrial.
3. Alecia's Allegations Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Constitute
Sufficient Grounds For A New Trial.
Criminal defendants have a Constitutional right to a fair trial. US Const.,
am. 6. Witness intimidation by a prosecutor can warrant a new trial where it
results in the denial of that right. State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah App 1992).
Due process imposes two additional duties on prosecutors: (1) the duty to timely
correct any false testimony, and (2) the duty to "provide, without request by the
defendant, all exculpatory evidence." State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App 351, 245 P.3d
206, 209. "A prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary: a prosecutor is the
representative.. .of a sovereignty.. .whose interest.. .in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Id. at 211 (internal
citations omitted). Prosecutorial misconduct thus constitutes grounds for a new
trial, if, absent a prosecutor's misconduct, the court concludes that "there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result." Utah
v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264,167 P.3d 516, 519.
In the instant case, Alecia has alleged witness intimidation, admission of
false testimony, and failure to provide exculpatory information. Alecia claims
that State coerced her into testifying by threatening her with criminal charges
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and the potential loss of child custody. Moreover, Alecia allegedly refused to
testify until the prosecutor physically forced her into the courtroom. Alecia
claims that she repeatedly told both the prosecutor and victim advocate that she
had falsely accused Charles and that they were pursuing false charges. Alecia
communicated these allegations twice, in written affidavits to the trial judge and
in testimony under oath at a motion hearing. Importantly, Alecia testified to
committing perjury after she was fully aware of the potential criminal
consequences of her actions. That Alecia was willing to criminal charges to set
clear the record is one factor that should be considered in determining the
credibility of her allegations.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Charles Williams was tried by jury and convicted on multiple
domestic violence charges. Following trial, the State's only substantive witness
recanted her testimony, shedding new light on the credibility of her testimony.
Additionally, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were brought to the courts
attention. Despite this new evidence, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion
to Arrest Judgment or for New Trial. The court abused its discretion by refusing
to grant the Defendant's motion, because (a) new evidence established that
Charles's conviction was not based on substantial reliable evidence; (b) new
evidence went to the central issue of the case; and (c) evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct warrants an order for new trial.
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RELIEF SOUGHT
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the trial
court's order and remand this case for arrest of judgment or new trial.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2fn$.

k
C. Danny Fraziei
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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